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Abstract 
This article explores the political effects of the development of systems analysis as a form of 
‘infrastructural knowledge’ – that is as a form of knowledge concerned with infrastructure, 
and an infrastructure of knowledge – that contributed to internal dissensus among scientific 
experts in the Soviet Union. Systems expertise is largely missing from existing work on the 
history of Soviet infrastructure. The article presents a historical analysis of the development 
of governmental, managerial and industrial applications of systems analysis in the Soviet 
context, as well as the transfer of Soviet systems expertise to developing countries. It argues 
that systems analysis constitutes a form of infrastructural knowledge which enabled Soviet 
scientists to criticize governmental policies, particularly large-scale, top-down infrastructure 
projects. This critique is interpreted as an expression of a new normativity regarding what 
constitutes good governance; it became particularly salient when Soviet scientists were facing 
infrastructural projects in the global South. Systems analysis, in this way, constituted an 
important intellectual resource for endogenous liberalization of the authoritarian regime.  
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This article considers the political effects of systems analysis as it was used to conceive, build 
and develop infrastructures in state socialist regimes between the 1960s and 1980s. Existing 
work on the political aspects of infrastructural projects describes the ways in which the 
failures of these projects have inspired civic movements leading to political change (Dawson 
1996; Larkin 2013; Collier 2011; Szeman & Boyer 2017). Furthermore, some scholars have 
proposed that controversies and conflicts surrounding infrastructure can be regarded as 
central to democracy because they question the status quo and empower marginal actors. For 
instance, in his influential study on the building of an oil pipe linking Azerbaijan, Georgia 
and Turkey, the political geographer Andrew Barry argued that this infrastructural project 
gave rise to new forms of political agencies, articulations and the pursuit of new interests and 
agendas, resulting in a “scientific” politics of dissensus. According to Barry, dissensus refers 
to the condition of disagreement and contestation that does not get resolved by presumably 
rational experts. Dissensus can become dormant and then re-activated in relation to new 
infrastructural projects. As technoscientific expertise perpetuates dissensus, the building of 
infrastructure, Barry suggests, has an important democratic value (Barry 2013, 9, 185).  
Focusing on the Soviet case, this article seeks to expand the empirical perspective of 
these studies by introducing new types of actors and new types of conditions under which 
dissensus can emerge and flourish. First, developing the approach of Barry (2013), the Soviet 
case shifts the focus from infrastructural failure as a source of political action to the planning 
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stage of infrastructure and its political effects. Second, of particular interest for this volume, 
rather than focus on party members, all-union and regional economic planners and local 
communities, who normally constitute the empirical focus of such work (Barry 2013; 
Obertreis 2017), this article discusses the role of systems analysis experts as producers of 
infrastructural knowledge. I argue that systems analysis experts were crucial for generating a 
politics of dissensus around infrastructural projects: they criticized the regime, articulating 
new notions of what good governance should look like. Systems analysis as a critical 
discourse on infrastructure was also facilitated by Cold War developmental politics, when the 
Soviet Union offered aid abroad in less developed countries, such as Cuba and Vietnam. It 
was in these contexts, when faced with infrastructural projects in developing countries, that 
the critical stance of systems analysts was particularly explicit. 
The focus on the role played by Soviet systems experts in the planning of 
infrastructure helps to make a broader point of relevance for studies of the transformation of 
state socialist economies by pointing to the capacity of science and technology to contribute 
to endogenous change. Early studies of systems analysis in state socialist political economies 
characterized it as a primarily technocratic activity, where decisions were made on the basis 
of expert knowledge and decoupled from public participation and political debate. Indeed, 
scientific technocracy was politically legitimate as long as experts did not challenge publicly 
the decision-making power of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and 
nomenclature officials (Obertreis 2017; Schönfelder forthcoming). However, recent work has 
brought back the idea that the transformation of state socialist regimes was also driven by 
forces that were endogenous to the governmental apparatus, such as officially sanctioned 
science and bureaucracy. As Yuen Yuen Ang suggested in relation to her study of China’s 
economic transformation, “within authoritarian regimes, bureaucratic change is political 
change” (Ang 2016, 1128). The same applies to technoscientific expertise. The politics of 
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systems analysis as dissensus that emerged around infrastructural questions is therefore 
different from dissidence, a form of outsider critique of Soviet government (Horvath 2005). 
Soviet systems dissenters were not “dissidents;” in fact, some of them did not approve of the 
dissident position at all. 
“Infrastructure” was not a widely used term in the context of Soviet planning, where 
the Marxist term of the “material and technical base” were preferred. However, Soviet 
systems scholars used the term from at least 1979 (Gestwa 2014, 209-210; Emel’ianov 2006, 
379). In line with Soviet political economy, they divided infrastructures into “productive” 
(rails, roads, water systems) and “non-productive” (education, public health) (Solius 1972). 
But this conceptual scheme excluded infrastructure built for the military-industrial complex. 
It also clashed conceptually with the Soviet doctrine of the scientific-technical revolution 
(STR), which, starting in 1956, posited that the state socialist regime was entering a post-
industrial stage, where science and technology were direct drivers of social and economic 
change (Rindzevičiūtė 2016a, 27-33; Rindzevičiūtė 2018). 
However, as the article shows, in practice, infrastructural projects interlinked science, 
state planning, and international politics. They placed systems scholars at the heart of some of 
the key political initiatives at home and abroad: conceiving, planning, building and 
maintaining infrastructure was not an isolated regional or national affair, but an 
internationally and transnationally networked activity. However, to appreciate the political 
impact of systems analysis as infrastructural knowledge one cannot use a “linear model”, 
according to which scientific expertise is just an input, a source of information for political 
decisions made by planning organs and the CPSU. In contrast, I argue that systems analysis 
should be regarded as a site where new governmental normativity was shaped and dissensus 
was practiced. These two components, I show, constituted an important resource for the 





Building Soviet infrastructure, creating dissensus 
 
According to Stephen Collier (2011, 49-64), the first attempt to go beyond the isolated public 
works that characterized Russian imperial modernization and to create infrastructure on a 
large scale could be found in the communist planning of the national electric grid, done at the 
State Commission for the Electrification of Russia (GOELRO). The GOELRO planners laid 
the conceptual foundations for the scientific forecasting of alternative scenarios of economic 
development and claimed that national planning required a new type of inter-sectorial 
knowledge to bridge different industry branches. After the Second World War, Soviet 
scientists used the intellectual legacy of GOELRO to legitimize the extension of “systems 
analysis” and operations research from military fields, such as logistics and the construction 
of advanced weapons systems, to civil planning.1  
The very definition of systems analysis varied depending on the field of its 
application. But most Soviet official definitions of systems analysis emphasized its 
performative and pragmatic character: systems analysis “is a collection of methodological 
means that are used to prepare and motivate decisions in relation to complex problems of a 
military, social, economic, scientific and technical nature” (Iudin 1976). Systems analysis, 
thus conceived, addresses “the problems of organization and the functioning of complex 
objects” (Blauberg and Iudin 1976). The systems experts who feature in this study share 
backgrounds in mathematics and computer science, which they applied to model the 
                                                          
1 For key studies in the history of systems analysis and systems thinking in East and West see 
Cocks (1980), Harrison (1985), Susiluoto (1982); Elichigiroity (1999); Hughes and Hughes 
(2000); Mindell (2004); Heyck (2015); Crook (2016); Rindzeviciute (2016a, 2018); Siskin 
(2016); Allan (2018). 
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functioning of complex systems, such as the ecology, the climate, organizations, industrial 
zones, agricultural farms, factories, mining, transport infrastructures and managerial 
apparatus. 
The shared mathematical background was not a coincidence: since the 1950s the 
practice of systems analysis was increasingly linked with computer modeling and, from the 
1960s, computerization of industrial infrastructures, such as electricity, oil and gas, and 
chemical plants.2 Systems expertise in infrastructure was to make planning, management and 
production more “efficient” and contribute to economic growth: systems analysts augmented 
branch expertise with integrated assessments of the planned infrastructure and its 
environment, technical, economic, and social consequences. Here systems analysis served the 
Soviet government on two global axes: first, the Soviet economy was expected to benefit 
from East-West transfer of the most advanced technology and know-how. Second, Soviet 
systems experts promoted the Soviet model of development in North-South transfer. In all, 
systems analysis was recognized as a priority area for domestic development and 
international transfer in Soviet research policy.3 
The institutional channels that enabled this transfer included the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE, est. 1947), the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD, est. 1961), the International Institute of Applied 
Systems Analysis (IIASA, est. 1972), the International Council of Scientific Unions’ 
Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment (ICSU, est. 1969) and the United 
                                                          
2 See the administrative nomenclature of the State Committee for Science and Technology 
(GKNT), Protocol (26 November 1970), the Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences 
(ARAN), op.6m, d. 473, l.19. The archival sources that this article builds on are mainly 
internal reports, communication and minutes of meetings at the Gosplan, the GKNT, the 
Presidium of the Academy of Sciences and the All-Union Computer Centre of the Academy 
of Sciences in Moscow. 
3 I base this statement on a decree of the All-Union Academy of Sciences that set out research 
priority areas for 1976-1990. ARAN, f.2, op.6m, d.518, l.11. 
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Nation’s Man and the Biosphere (MAB, est. 1971).4 The leading Soviet systems scientists 
had both formal (IIASA, UN, ICSU, MAB) and informal (OECD, UNECE) relations with 
international organizations, which helped co-produce and exchange statistical data, but also  
shape critical agendas.5 After all, according to the official Soviet definition, infrastructure 
was a central site of political contestation in the West, where infrastructure was part of the 
capitalist arsenal for exploiting the working class (Solius 1972). However, in some cases this 
narrow Marxist interpretation was ignored by East-West scientists who eagerly used the 
systems approach to the planning of infrastructure to build bridges. IIASA, for instance, 
commissioned reports on complex infrastructures such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and 
Bratsk-Ilimsk territorial production complex in Irkutsk, the trans-Siberian Baikal-Amur 
Mainline (BAM) and Shinkansen railway, which were to be co-written by Soviet and 
Western scholars (Knop 1977, 1976; Morosov and Podvoiski 1977).  
The key issues in the practice of systems analysis in the Soviet Union were pervasive 
secrecy, and therefore scarce and poor quality data. Fine-grained case analyses rarely found 
their way into the public domain. For instance, the flagship journal of the All-Union Systems 
Research Institute (VNIISI), Systems Research (Sistemnye issledovaniia), established in 
1969, contained only general theoretical articles in the 1970s and 1980s. This is despite the 
fact that VNIISI scholars developed a great many applications for the industry in this period. 
Data and reports which were sourced through international channels were restricted to 
internal circulation in selected institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. This lack of 
                                                          
4 The Russian Archive of the Economy (RGAE), f. 99, op. 1, d. 890, l.127-130; (Selcer 2018; 
Rindzeviciute 2016a; Andersson and Duhautois 2016). For the history of Soviet systems 
scientists in East-West international organization, see Gemelli (1998), Riska-Campbell 
(2011), Rindzeviciute (2016). 
5 For instance, so keen was the secretary of the UN Development Planning Committee to hear 
a talk on industrial planning in state socialist countries, that he would offer the economist and 
future director of Gosplan’s Institute for Scientific Research into the Economy (NIEI), Vadim 
N. Kirichenko, not only a 1,000 USD fee, but also a grant to do preliminary research. 
“Materialy… (1966-1974),” RGAE, f. 99, op.1, d.904, l.125-126. 
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transparency was noticed and criticized: for instance, an engineer at the Ministry of Water 
Management and the Academy of Science’s Computer Centre proposed that an internal 
newsletter of VNIISI was made publicly available to all scholars.6 Because of this concern 
with secrecy, such requests were overlooked and the entire field of Soviet systems research 
remained in the shadows, underexplored and underappreciated. However, these difficulties, 
which were endemic and typical of Soviet science, should not suggest that systems scientists 
were inconsequential in practice. As this section shows, the key systems scientists derived 
their authority and legitimacy from their material successes in designing infrastructures. As a 
rule, such successful implementation of systems expertise can be found not in large flagship 
projects, but in localized applications, in the incremental creation of a computer infrastructure 
for Soviet industries and enterprises. This should not be surprising, as STS scholars have long 
argued that large technical systems always emerge incrementally, rather than being imposed 
from above (Edwards et al 2007, Star 1999). This insight is particularly productive in the case 
of Soviet infrastructure projects, where the emphasis on centralist, top-down and large scale 
projects was part of public propaganda. In reality, even Soviet infrastructure emerged by 
piece-meal, accompanied by internal dissensus among scientific experts. 
A good example of the incremental and localized assembling of infrastructure is the 
Viktor Glushkov’s widely studied project of an all-union automated system (OGAS), which 
never came to fruition as a full system. Scholars have pointed out that the Soviet failure to 
construct a large scale, centralized and integrated digital infrastructure demonstrated the 
regime’s inability to respond to the challenges of the advanced political economy based on 
information (Castells 1996; Castells and Kiselyova 1995).7 Both technical lag and internal 
                                                          
6 F. Efremenko, “Otchet,” (June-August 1979), ARAN, f.1918, op.1, d.447, l.78. 
7 For instance, archival documents show that Soviet computer centers were not linked into a 
digital network in 1973. However, there were several international networks in operation 
from 1973: an experimental connection linked the IIASA and the Institute of Control 
Problems (IPU) in Moscow in 1974 and the IIASANET network connected West and East 
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institutional competition hampered the project of the Soviet internet.8 However, 
computerized systems were incrementally introduced, forming an archipelago of automation, 
intertwined with other vital industrial infrastructures, which were also assembled 
incrementally. Consider, for instance, the famous oil pipeline called Friendship (Druzhba), 
built between 1959 and 1964, to supply crude oil to Western Europe from the Soviet Union, 
which was expected to lay the foundations for close East-West relations in technology 
transfer (Gestwa 2014, 221). The Soviet Union contracted the pipes and other strategic 
materials from Italy and the UK, despite the United States’ open and covert attempts to block 
the trade deals. Western loans helped too, and in the 1980s Soviet gas began to flow from the 
fields in Western Siberia to the West (Petrovic 2017, 12). The actual local implementation of 
the pipelines stemmed not so much from the central authorities, but largely resulted from the 
lobbying of different industry groups; local interests, rather than long-term forecasts, 
determined the success of the pipeline construction (Nekrasov 2017). Pipeline construction 
did not follow a pre-defined, top-down plan and, although OGAS failed as a national system, 
the Institute of Cybernetics founded by Glushkov provided automated management systems 
to some 80% of overall pipelines.9  
The OGAS story is important because it shows, first, the strategic importance of 
computerization, but also, second, that the success of computerization was intertwined with 
the development of different types of infrastructure. As systems scholars mainly had 
backgrounds in applied mathematics and computer science, they served as important 
                                                          
European systems research institutions in the 1970s (Rindzeviciute 2016a, 119-120). ARAN, 
f. 2, op.1, d. 66, l.27-35. 
8 See the vast literature detailing the many reasons, technical, political and social: 
Conyngham (1980), Cave (1980), Crowe and Goodman (1994), Castells (1996), Pospelov 
and Fet (1998), Gerovitch (2002), Rindzeviciute (2011), Tatarchenko (2013), Peters (2016), 
Leeds (2016), and Ericson, this volume.  




mediators between computer technology and decision making in infrastructure design. For 
instance, VNIISI scientists created different applications for planning decisions in industry 
enterprises, such as the Moskvich automobile factory, a Belarusian machine factory and the 
nuclear power plant constructions by the Soiuzatomenergostroi (construction company 
engaged in nuclear energy projects). In the 1980s VNIISI was commissioned by the Navy to 
create a computerized diagnostic system, MEDIKS, to assist in detection of heart conditions 
and assess coma states. This system was adopted in several military hospitals (Emel’ianov 
2006, p.74-75). VNIISI also modelled complex technological processes for the Severonikel 
factory in Monchegorsk and created a demographic modeling system, Mul’tidem, which was 
used by the State Committee for Statistics (Goskomstat). VNIISI systems scientists 
developed models for territorial and branch industry planning; perhaps one of the best known 
applications was a model for development and management of the Institute of Steel at the 
Kansk-Achinsk Fuel and Energy complex (KATEK) and for Minusinsk electrotechnical 
industrial complex (Emel’ianov 2006, pp. 44, 120, 137, 325). As Rutland (1993, 137-8) 
noted, KATEK’s construction and management continued to fail, partially because it was 
based on an innovative technological system and partially because of its administrative 
regional status, which made the complex a lower priority.  
Systems scientists derived their prestige from their position as problem solvers in the 
priority areas. The founder of VNIISI, Dzhermen Gvishiani, was the son-in-law of Prime 
Minister Kosygin and deputy director of State Committee for Science and Technology 
(GKNT), but many other systems scientists were also well connected and used these 
connections to put their applications into practice. According to VNIISI’s scientist Iurii 
Popkov, it was thanks to the architect and urban planner Aleksei Gutnov, their contact at the 
research institute of the General Plan of the Development of Moscow, that VNIISI were able 
to create an operational computer model to analyze and control an urban macrosystem. This 
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project was supported by the deputy chairman of the State Committee for Construction 
(Gosstroi), Genadii Fomin, and the chairman of the Architectural Planning Commission of 
Moscow, Mikhail Posokhin. The political profile of the project was further enhanced by its 
links with the East-West research collaboration on urban systems and demography at IIASA 
(Emel’ianov 2006, p.105-106, 114). One of the outcomes of this work was a model of 
gravitational zones (zones that attract visits, e.g. factories or shopping areas) the location of 
which is determined by transport infrastructure. This model enabled the exploration of the 
probabilistic interaction of urban subsystems, such as the population, economic basis, 
housing and services, which allowed the detection of new forms of urban dynamics 
(Emel’ianov 2006, 114-5).  
Although further research needs be done on the outcomes of these applications of 
systems expertise, it should be clear by now that Soviet systems scientists, based at the 
central research institutes, were well positioned to claim the limited authority and autonomy 
that they were awarded in exchange for their service to the regime (Graham 1987; Holloway 
1999). Unlike members of the general public and dissidents, systems scientists could attack 
infrastructural proposals at their planning stage. Indeed, the history of late modern Soviet 
infrastructure contains quite a few examples of such practices of internal dissent, which 
originated from both central institutions in Moscow and individual republics. Internal 
scientific dissensus was often directed against the highly symbolic projects of infrastructure. 
For instance, in 1970s Lithuania scientists protested against the plan to build additional 
reactors at Ignalina nuclear power plant, a plant that at the moment of its construction was the 
most powerful in the world (Stsiapanau 2017). In the mid-1980s VNIISI produced a cost-
benefit analysis advising the government against heavy, expensive investments in the further 
development of Baikal-Amur Railway (BAM), one of the Soviet projects of the century that 
was draining the country’s economic resources. Although BAM was continued, construction 
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of a new high speed railway connecting Moscow and Leningrad was not pursued because of 
Stanislav Shatalin’s report that demonstrated the project’s load on the already struggling 
economy (Emel’ianov 2006, 374). Perhaps the most widely known case of internal scientific 
dissent is the opposition to Stalin’s plans to divert Siberian rivers to irrigate the central Asian 
steppe. The river diversion project was resisted by many Soviet scientists, including 
pedologists, economists and environmental computer modelers (Duke 2006; Obertreis 2017; 
Schönfelder forthcoming). The latter ones had a particularly significant tool to make their 
arguments persuasive (Majone 1989): the computer technology. Systems modelers at VNIISI 
and the Academy of Science’s Computer Centre in Moscow could draw on their 
internationally recognized expertise in computer simulation of hydrological processes and 
ecological modeling of the complex biosphere. Although VNIISI and the Computer Centre 
were competitors, they joined the effort to oppose the river diversion project, demonstrating 
its catastrophic consequences for complex ecological systems. Both scientific insights and 
personal feelings mattered in this case: the Computer Centre’s director Anatoliy Dorodnitsyn 
is said to have spontaneously reacted to the idea of the river diversion, pointing out that this 
would cause desertification in Ukraine, a country that he was particularly fond of 
(Dorodnitsyna, Evtushenko, Shevchenko 2015). 
The ability of systems analysis as infrastructural knowledge to generate and host 
continuous dissensus inside the governmental and technocratic elites was probably best 
expressed in the nascent fields of environmental science and Earth system modeling. 
According to the patron of global modeling and the Computer Center’s deputy director for 
research, Nikita Moiseev, computer models of the global and complex biosphere had to 
become an epistemological and material link between different academic fields, becoming a 
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sociomaterial network able to bridge institutional divides.10 The Computer Center’s scientists 
designed a global modeling system of this kind to study the geophysical, ecological and 
socioeconomic changes in the Earth system, particularly focusing on how it is influenced by 
“homo sapiens as a species on the Earth”.11 This model was conceptually based on Vladimir 
Vernadskii’s idea of an Earth system comprised of physical processes of energy exchange 
and inspired by Vladimir Kostitsyn’s attempts to model the global biosphere mathematically 
(Vernadsky [1926]1998; Kostitzin 1935). The physical Earth model was enriched with a 
“human activity” block, a sub-system, based on macroeconomic models of demographic and 
production data (which was in great shortage). Even more complex was a separate model of 
the unknown human future, “the scientific-technical progress,” which required at least “a 
simple description of and access to statistical data” on future trends.12 The model was 
conceptually designed to capture global development as a complex problem, where 
interaction between “the man and the environment” was defined as a problem of stability to 
be explored through existing operations research techniques. To furnish this model with the 
necessary data, Computer Center scholars cooperated with many other institutes, such as 
VNIISI, the Central Economic Mathematical Institute (CEMI), meteorology and oceanology 
institutes in Leningrad, Novosibirsk and Vladivostok as well as others (Rindzevičiūtė 2016a). 
The original intention of global computer modeling was to produce new fundamental 
knowledge on the global biosphere, which would help build regional models that could 
supply reliable information for decision-making in the management of large sectors, such as 
fisheries, agriculture and so on. Such scaled-down models would investigate the multiple 
                                                          
10 Nikita Moiseev to N.N. Bogoliubov (18 July 1983), “Novye rezul’taty v modelirovanii 
global’nykh biogeotsenoticheskikh protsessov,” ARAN, f.1918, op.1, d.519, l.129-190. 
11 Ibid, l.132. 
12 Ibid, l.137-143. 
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failures of infrastructures as the result of the potential conflict.13 In 1983 the global modelers 
produced a powerful dissensus creating a significant controversy in defense and foreign 
policy: the famous report on the environmental effects of nuclear war.14 By actively initiating 
a public information campaign, Soviet scientists hoped that the nuclear winter study would 
send a clear and convincing message about the complexity of the “catastrophe” of nuclear 
war to the military, described as “the most dangerous people” (in Russian, samyi opasnyi 
narod) by the nuclear physicist Pyotr Kapitsa.15 
Soviet systems scientists’ dissensus did not result in clear-cut resolutions (Barry 2013, 
19). It even failed where it succeeded: the territorial production complex Bratsk was one of 
the world’s most polluted cities. The celebrated East-West gas and oil pipes leaked, 
damaging the environment and leading to severe accidents, such as a gas explosion damaging 
two passenger trains in the Ural region in 1989. Pollution emitted from the nickel factory in 
Monchegorsk, which was made more productive thanks to VNIISI’s fundamental research 
into boiling liquids, was killing forests in the surrounding area (Gestwa 2014, 218-219; 
Bruno 2016). Systems experts’ dissensus could not become open criticism of the planning 
organs or CPSU, at least not until Mikhail Gorbachev announced glasnost’ in 1986. Notably, 
one of Gorbachev’s advisors was the famous “dissenter” Nikita Moiseev (Rindzevičiūtė 
2018; Rindzevičiūtė 2019). However, as the next section shows, Soviet systems analysts felt 
less constrained to criticize the norms and practices embedded in state socialist governmental 
apparatus when facing infrastructural failures abroad and not in their own country.  
 
                                                          
13 Reports which included not only accounts of environmental and demographic damage, but 
also failures of public health systems, decline of production, particularly agriculture, were 
discussed at the presidium of the Academy of Sciences in February 1983. ARAN, f.2, op.1, 
d.844, l.14, 100-148.  
14 For studies of nuclear winter, see Badash (2009), Edwards (2012), Rindzeviciute (2016) 
and Rubinson (2016). 




Soviet systems dissensus faces international development  
 
The Cold War politics of development opened up opportunities for Soviet systems analysts to 
practice dissensus in relation to the building of infrastructure. The Soviet aid programs, 
which were called “economic cooperation” in Russian, created a wide, interlocking net of 
actors, which included scientific experts, whose actions revolved around the construction of 
new, large infrastructural projects (Engerman 2017, 11). Soviet expertise in systems analysis 
constituted an important intellectual export that was intended to contribute to the 
development of infrastructure in “friendly countries”.16 The GKNT received requests and 
reports from Soviet diplomats in developing countries requesting assistance with planning 
expertise. For instance, a Soviet diplomat to Senegal reported that the UN Economic 
Commission for Africa, the Institute of Economic Development and Planning, wished to 
cooperate with Gosplan regarding regional planning in Africa.17 The all-union Academy of 
Sciences dedicated a research unit for the Methods for Planning Developing Systems, which 
regularly dispatched Soviet scientists to developing countries. Providing scientific expertise 
for infrastructure was a high priority on Soviet aid projects (Kochetkova et al. 2017).  
Ironically, while Soviet industrial plants emitted high levels of pollution and 
agricultural melioration schemes crushed fragile ecologies, Soviet aid for developing 
countries emphasized environmental protection (Perelet 1986). Robert Darst (2001) described 
this phenomenon as a cynical “greening” of Soviet foreign policy. However, some of these 
environmental efforts were initiated by Soviet systems scientists themselves as they looked to 
                                                          
16 For examples of similar Western export of automation for the development in Chile and 
Mexico, see Medina (2011) and Polgovsky (2017). For more on Soviet aid see Sanchez-
Sibony (2014) and Iandolo (2012). 
17 “Materialy…1966-1974,” RGAE, f. 99, op.1, d.899, l. 15. 
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learn from their experience abroad. For example, the Computer Centre in Moscow developed 
regional models for exploitation of oil resources in Ethiopia and, in the late 1970s, for an 
agricultural economy in Iraq (Dorodnitsyna, Evtushenko, Shevchenko 2015, 339). The Iraq 
modelling exercise generated insights into water management that were later adapted for the 
Soviet context.18 The most striking, however, is that being in a position of a donor conferred 
on the already influential scientists a sense of high status, imbuing them with a sense of 
responsibility and a duty to voice criticism. This becomes quite clear when reading internal 
reports written by Soviet systems scientists sent to Cuba and Vietnam. 
In October 1978, Vladimir R. Khachaturov, then the head of the research unit of 
evolutionary systems design at the Computer Center, and a rising star of computer-based 
design of oil and gas extraction systems, was sent to the Institute of Mathematics, 
Cybernetics and Computer Technology of the Cuban Academy of Sciences to train local 
scientists. Khachaturov, who spoke Spanish fluently, spent ten days giving workshops on the 
engineering of imitational modeling systems that could be used for optimal planning and 
particularly the siting of industries (Dorodnitsyna, Evtushenko, Shevchenko 2015, 193). This 
trip took place in the context of the agreement for Soviet-Cuban cooperation in science and 
technology, signed in 1960, which committed the Soviets to training of Cuban experts on the 
ground. The director of the Computer Center first visited the Academy of Sciences in Havana 
only in 1967. Increasingly intensive cooperation developed in the 1970s: in 1973 the 
Computer Centre and the Institute of Informatics and Computer Technology of the Cuban 
Academy of Sciences signed an institutional cooperation agreement (Dorodnitsyna, 
Evtushenko, Shevchenko 2015, 183, 185). As the Cuban government charged its Academy of 
Sciences’ institutes with creating a complex plan for the development of the national 
                                                          
18 “Otchet Vycheslitelnogo Tsentra AN SSSR o vypolnenie plana tekhnonauchnogo 
sotrudnechestva” (1979), ARAN, f.1918, op.1, d.445, l.10. 
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economy in 1977, Soviet experts also consulted Cubans on planning methodologies and 
assisted in the making of five-year plans for the national economy (Kochetkova et al 2017, 
13, 15). More specifically, Soviet experts studied the planning of the new Cuban urban 
infrastructure, the siting of settlements and management of population migration flows and 
offered policy advice on the development.19 
In their internal reports from Cuba, Soviet experts noted not only the lack of access to 
energy and challenges of terrain (Kochetkova et al 2017, 13-14), but also the gap between the 
governmental practices and what they saw as a proper modern governmental imagination, 
based on systems thinking. Material infrastructures that resulted from flawed governmental 
decisions were seen as visible symptoms of an under-developed scientific governance. For 
example, Khachaturov found his Cuban colleagues mathematically “literate” and “gifted,” as 
well as technically equipped: the research institute that he visited had Edinaia series 
computers, based on IBM S/360, produced in Eastern Europe (Goodman 2003, 24). However, 
according to Khachaturov, Cuban scientists lacked experience of designing large 
infrastructural systems and had next to no knowledge of mathematical modeling. Even more 
perplexing for this Soviet expert was his observation that the Cubans did not even consider 
the possibility of solving national economic problems with the help of computer modeling. 
Trying to show the benefits of systems modeling, Khachaturov demonstrated his model of a 
more rational siting of roads in Isla de Pinos (renamed Isla de Juventud in 1978). On the 
island massive motorways were built to symbolize the technological progress of Cuban 
communism. A more compact road infrastructure, however, would have saved very valuable 
fertile soil and, in turn, increased the production of citrus fruit by 10%. Khachaturov was 
desperate about the lack of Cuban interest in modeling the systemic effects of new 
                                                          
19 For example, in 1972 the sociologist V. Chuprov from IKSI requested permission to travel 
to Cuba to explore the migration and youth problems emerging in relation to new settlements. 
ARAN, f.1977, op.1, d.72, l.7. 
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infrastructures, particularly as he considered Cuba to be a “modelable” country: the economy 
was not complex yet, primarily based on agriculture, the size of the territory was quite small 
and the relevant research data was largely available.20 Back at home Soviet modelers did not 
enjoy such conveniences. It is not likely that Khachaturov’s criticism was taken into 
consideration. According to Diaz-Briquets and Perez Lopez (2000, 5), Cuba “wasted” the 
Soviet assistance in both funding and expertise, overinvesting into large scale agricultural 
projects without any regard to environmental costs. Not all flagship plans, like a project to 
drain sea water between Isla de Pinos and the mainland creating more agricultural land (Diaz-
Briquets and Perez Lopez 2000, 15) were implemented. Yet former colonial elites of Cuba 
mourned the modernization of the island where “big, ugly buildings and people, people 
everywhere” replaced what was remembered as idyllic, pre-industrial beauty (Neagle 2016, 
276). 
The extensive report by Khachaturov testifies to a strong professional take on what 
constitutes proper systems analysis. His frustration with his peers in Cuba reveals a strong 
normativity and expectation that similar standards should be applied in the Soviet Union as 
well. Other Soviet systems scientists were also explicit about the existing gap between the 
theory and reality of infrastructural planning, both at home and in the developing countries. 
Particularly telling here is Moiseev’s report from his one month-long visit to Vietnam by the 
invitation of the local state committee for science and technology in the winter of 1978-1979, 
almost immediately after the conclusion of Soviet-Vietnamese treaty of friendship and 
cooperation (Radchenko 2014, 127). The trajectory of modern Vietnam’s development was 
shaped by French colonial infrastructure-building, but, beginning in 1954, Northern Vietnam 
                                                          
20 “Othcet o nauchnoi komandirovki sotrudnika Vych. tsentra AN SSSR zavedushego 
sektorom metodov proektirovaniia razvivaiushchikh sistem kandidat fiziko-matematicheskikh 
nauk V.R. Khachaturova v Institut matematiki, kibernetiki i vycheslitelnoi tekhniki AN 
Kuby” (15 December 1978), ARAN, f. 1918, op.1, d.423, l.76-94. 
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received aid with education and infrastructural projects from the Soviet Union, as well as 
Warsaw pact countries (Prybyla 1966; Sanchez-Sibony 2015). While, for example, East 
German engineers constructed the town of Vinh to showcase the state socialist standards of 
residential housing, Soviet experts like Moiseev were consulted by the Vietnamese 
government leaders on planning methodologies (Schwenken 2015).21 Many Vietnamese 
scientists were trained in Soviet institutes in Moscow and Leningrad. Ho Chi Minh himself 
visited the Computer Center in Moscow commenting that it was “very interesting, but 
difficult to understand” how computerized systems research could be applied in a country at a 
very low level of development (Dorodnitsyna, Evtushenko, Shevchenko 2015, 128). The 
Computer Center would establish a lasting cooperation with the nascent Vietnamese 
computer science. Indeed, even a building at the research center in Hanoi would be designed 
by Nikolai Kupriianov, who also designed building of the Moscow’s Computer Center 
(Dorodnitsyna, Evtushenko, Shevchenko 2015, 90).  
A cooperation agreement between the Soviet GKNT and the Vietnam State 
Committee of Science and Technology was signed in 1959; in 1960 a Vietnamese delegation, 
headed by the vice minister of defense, visited the Computer Center in Moscow, and, in 
1974, Dorodnitsyn travelled to renew the agreement. From the second half of the 1970s the 
Computer Center’s directors and scientists paid regular annual visits to North and South 
Vietnam, particularly Hanoi, where scientific research was concentrated, but also the sea 
biology laboratory in Haiphong, as well as to Ho Chi Minh City and the Dalat nuclear 
research institute. The Vietnamese weather forecasts were done on Minsk-22 and Minsk-32 
computers. As Deng Xiaoping’s China was increasingly opening up channels of cooperation 
                                                          
21 Dorodnitsyn, who, alongside with Moiseev, co-directed the Computer Centre, headed the 
Soviet delegation to establish scientific-technical cooperation with Vietnam in January-
February 1971. During this trip Dorodnitsyn was shown Vinh as a site of the US destruction, 




with Western powers, the Soviet Union had increased its aid to Vietnam to secure the Soviet 
position in the region (Radchenko 2014, 13-14). From the 1980s, Soviet scientists sought to 
establish cooperation with the Vietnamese in areas that required urgent environmental 
attention, such as the Mekong delta and the underwater shelf, the investigation of which was 
important for the construction of oil rigs (Dorodnitsyna, Evtushenko, Shevchenko 2015, 184-
5, 204-205, 207, 441). 
During his stay Moiseev read lectures on systems analysis, particularly imitation 
modelling and dialogue systems; these technologies were designed to align computational 
processes with the organizational need to work on different projects, continually adding new 
data. Moiseev’s audience included members of the Vietnamese state planning committee, the 
state security university, as well as academic researchers, many of whom received their 
training in the Soviet Union. Just like Khachaturov in Cuba, Moiseev agreed that local 
scholars had good scientific potential, but he could not help noticing the scars of the Vietnam 
wars: in his report Moiseev wrote that only about 30% of scholars stayed, while the rest 
emigrated. Vietnamese academia was divided by the class struggle: some of older generation 
scholars had to be “re-educated” in the spirit of communist ideology (in Russian, 
perevospitaniye). As Moiseev raised the issue of the lack of scientists, a vice-chairman of the 
Vietnamese Gosplan dismissed his comment saying that “they used to receive 1,000 USD 
before liberation. They are certainly all spies. Let them grow rice!” Moiseev described 
Saigon’s situation as “catastrophic,” “hanging like a stone around the neck of the country.” 
Vietnamese leaders, he wrote, should find “organizational forms” to use the competence of 
the existing Saigon inhabitants.22 Moiseev expressed his disappointment with the absence of 
the systemic organization of research, lack of leadership and “fragmented themes” in the 
                                                          
22 I refer to place names as they appear in the sources, e.g. Peking, Saigon and so on. “Otchet 
o nauchnoi komandirovke vo V’etnam zam. direktora Vych. tsentra chlena korrespondenta 
AN SSSR Moiseeva N.N.,” ARAN, f.1918, op.1, d.423, l. 129-130. 
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university curriculum.23 One can sense an indirect criticism of the universalist ambitions of 
Soviet planning in Moiseev’s account of his meeting with the head of the planning 
methodology of the Vietnamese Gosplan, who was intended to copy “blindly” the Soviet 
system of planning, without considering the importance of local context, particularly the 
wartime experience, which, according to Moiseev, formed the foundation for Soviet scientific 
governance.  
In this report Moiseev effectively argued that governmental and planning projects 
must be organically rooted in the local context and not mechanically imposed from above. He 
was particularly concerned about the Vietnamese colleague’s authoritarian views and reliance 
on direct command methods. The attitude in the Vietnamese Gosplan, wrote Moiseev, could 
be summarized in the following sentence: “if people are sufficiently disciplined and trained to 
implement orders, do you really need all that science of governance?”.24 This, for Moiseev, 
was a lamentable approach to governance. 
The Russian scientist also expressed his dissatisfaction with what he described as the 
Vietnamese obsession with giant scale. As he put it, when the Vietnamese experts try to 
model a process of production, they start with a model based on many millions of tons. 
Similarly, when an agricultural cooperative is organized, the planners talk about their 
ambition to develop thousands of hectares into productive fields. In this process, wrote 
Moiseev, Vietnamese experts had not only forgotten their national traditions, but also the 
absence of mundane but necessary infrastructure, such as roads, machine equipment and 
transport. Even basic agricultural science, which requires that a rice field would not be larger 
than “100 m2”, is ignored.  
                                                          




Moiseev contrasted this obsession with grand scale with “pragmatism,” which he 
valued highly. According to Moiseev, without pragmatism any governance degrades into 
mechanical compliance (in Russian, nachetnichestvo). In Vietnam he claimed to have found 
signs of pragmatism only at the Central Committee’s Institute of Management, directed by a 
European-trained economist. Other than that, Moiseev found it unjustifiable that Saigon 
promoted the prestigious high-tech areas of science, such as space and plasma research, at the 
expense of basic, mundane systems engineering that would improve people’s everyday 
lives.25 Moiseev was not alone in voicing this criticism: many Soviet but also East European, 
experts criticized Asian developing countries for their obsession with Stalinist megaprojects 
(Szalontai 2008; Radchenko 2014).  
There is more to what can appear as donor-client critique. Moiseev, by criticizing 
Vietnam, practiced a politics of dissensus: he expressed a new governmental normativity, 
which did not blindly support the priority of big science and the military-industrial complex. 
This new normativity later found expression in Gorbachev’s reforms: indeed, Gorbachev 
himself compared his experience of reforming the state socialist system with that of the 
Vietnamese in 1989; although later, according to Radchenko, Gorbachev bitterly regretted 
that the Vietnamese appeared to be overtaking what was earlier posited as a development 
model, the Soviet Union (Radchenko 2014, 135). 
What is even more important, this example shows that critical dissensus was formed 
not only in contact with the liberal capitalist model, which was held up as an example for 
Soviet modernization, but also in contact with the non-Western developmental experience in 
the global South. Contacts between Eastern experts, as Gewirtz (2017) recently demonstrated, 
were much more regular and significant than Cold war and development historians have 
                                                          
25 Ibid, l.127-131. 
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tended to think: East-East learning was an integral part of the liberalization of state socialist 




Modern states used infrastructural projects to enchant or revolutionize their populations 
(Szeman & Boyer 2017; Boyer 2016; Larkin 2013; Anand, Gupta, Apppel 2018), while 
failing infrastructures enabled populations to question the governing regimes (Gestwa 2014; 
Schwenkel 2015). When infrastructure fails, it becomes visible (Edwards 2004; Edwards et al 
2007; Lampland and Star 2009; Graham 2010; Harvey and Knox 2015). And indeed, Soviet 
efforts to construct new infrastructures, both material and epistemological, often failed or 
were implemented at great human cost (Kotkin 1995; Josephson 2002; Bruno 2016).   
However, this article argues that infrastructural projects had the potential to transform 
governing regimes not only at their end points of use or failure, but also at their planning 
stages. This becomes quite clear when attention is shifted away from planners or managers 
(who tend to be criticized and held responsible when infrastructure fails) to systems analysis 
experts (who remain invisible in the public eye). This article proposed that Soviet systems 
analysts, by commenting on large infrastructure projects, engaged in a politics of dissensus, 
as they continuously revealed the failures of infrastructural planning. This critical position 
was made possible by the authority that these analysts gained though having made significant 
contributions to the military-industrial complex: their loyalty was not under question and they 
enjoyed high social status and relative professional autonomy (Holloway 1999).  
In this context, I argued, systems analysis played the role of infrastructural 
knowledge, bounding theoretical insights and methodologies with organization- and 
institution-building efforts, materialities and social worlds. When this infrastructure-building 
24 
 
effort took Soviet systems scholars to developing countries, systems analysis facilitated their 
criticisms of what were considered to be typical practices of state socialist, centrally 
commanded economic systems. Systems analysis as infrastructural knowledge harbored a 
normative view on governability, seeking to transform the political imaginaries of 
governance by underscoring the importance of local context and dangers of “large science 
and technology” (Jasanoff and Kim 2015). In line with Ang’s work on Chinese bureaucracy 
(Ang 2016, 14441), this insight must be extended to recognize the importance of internal 
deliberation in what might appear as a monolithic Soviet technocracy. 
It is therefore fundamentally important to draw on the existing theoretical basis of the 
politics of infrastructure in order to better understand the role of technoscientific expertise in 
the Soviet Union. As is demonstrated in this special issue, state socialist political economy 
developed through highly contested negotiations between science, political ideology and 
pragmatic actors. What should not get lost in this conversation is that this was not only a 
struggle for power, but also a search for answers to the question of what could be done to lift 
populations out of poverty. In many cases this search failed and, where Soviet modernization 
succeeded, growth was achieved at a high human and environmental cost.26 Yet a general 
lesson can be learned from this Soviet story: intellectual, political and social histories should 
address systems analysis as infrastructural knowledge that can give rise to a politics of 




                                                          
26 For struggles in the postwar rebuilding of city infrastructure see Dale (2015). 
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